The Supreme Court’s Intuition

I’ve noticed over the years that, at least with regard to judicial disqualification, the Supreme Court has a penchant for making interesting assertions about human psychology, but then failing to provide an empirical basis for its claims — a matter I discuss in more detail with regard to the Court’s recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Williams in a new blog post on the New England Law faculty website, On Remand.

Update: 06/23/16:  Others have written more extensively about the role of unconscious bias with regard to judicial recusal and disqualification.  For some of the scholarship in this area, see:

Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule on A Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 659 (2015)

 Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 Val. U. L. Rev. 807 (2015)

 Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 235 (2013)

 Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 181 (2011)

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